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 Abstract— We present an efficient multi-plane based fast 
network failure recovery scheme which can be realized using 
the recently proposed multi-path enabled BGP platforms. We 
mainly focus on the recovery scheme that takes into account 
BGP routing disruption avoidance at network boundaries, 
which can be caused by intra-AS failures due to the hot potato 
routing effect. On top of this scheme, an intelligent IP 
crank-back operation is also introduced for further 
enhancement of network protection capability against 
failures. Our simulations based on both real operational 
network topologies and synthetically generated ones suggest 
that, through our proposed optimized backup egress point 
selection algorithm, as few as two routing planes are able to 
achieve high degree of path diversity for fast recovery in any 
single link failure scenario.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In plain IGP based routing environments the failure of an 
intra-AS (Autonomous System) link may trigger the 
underlying routing protocol to re-converge which may take 
up to several seconds, while BGP re-convergence following 
an inter-AS link failure may even take much longer time 
[1]. Such routing disruptions may lead to transient 
forwarding loops which result in packet loss. On the other 
hand, an intra-AS link failure can also disrupt BGP routing 
due to the hot potato routing effect: the IGP distance from 
any specific router to individual AS border routers 
(ASBRs) may change after an intra-AS link failure, hence 
this router may automatically switch to a new egress point if 
its IGP distance becomes shorter than the post-failure 
distance to the original default egress point after IGP 
re-converges. This type of egress router switching caused 
by intra-AS link failures is very common, and more 
importantly, cannot be as easily handled or even 
anticipated by the ISP as the inter-AS link failure scenario 
[2]. As a result, automatically diverted inter-AS transit 
traffic after IGP re-convergence may unexpectedly 
overwhelm the alternate egress point or even downstream 
ASes.  
In this paper, we propose a holistic IP Fast Reroute (FRR) 
technique that not only protects both intra- and inter-AS 
link failures, but also enables controlled egress point 
switching that avoids unexpected BGP routing disruptions 
due to the hot potato routing effect. The proposed scheme is 
based on multi-plane aware BGP routing paradigms that 
enable multiple concurrent routes towards any specific 
remote destination prefix. Such multi-path BGP routing 
protocols have been recently proposed in the literature, 
including R-BGP [3] and BGP Path Splicing [4]. In both 
schemes, each BGP speaker maintains multiple inter-AS 
routes towards remote destination prefixes, with the 
primary route being used in the normal condition and 
backup routes (typically enforced through tunnels towards 
different egress points) used in case the primary ones 
become unavailable, for instance due to network failures.  
In this paper, we define BGP routing planes in order to 
indicate multiple BGP routes maintained at each BGP 
speaker. All the primary routes used in the normal situation 
are identified as the paths maintained in the default routing 
plane (plane 0), and other K-1 backup routing planes can be 
defined if each BGP speaker maintains at most K-1 backup 
routes towards each specific destination prefix. If a remote 
prefix can be reachable via multiple ASBRs, one of them 
can be used as the unique primary egress point according to 
the ISP’s normal routing policy (through setting the highest 
local_pref value), while the rest can also be strategically 
selected by the ISP as backups for fast recovery against 
both intra- and inter-AS failures. Towards this end, we 
introduce in this paper an efficient backup egress point 
selection algorithm in the backup routing planes in order to 
maximize the protection coverage of failures. In case a link 
failure occurs, the local repairing router may intelligently 
divert the affected customer traffic onto one of the backup 
routes (through tunnels based on existing implementation 
of multi-path BGP platforms [3][4]) with an alternate 
backup egress point in order to avoid passing through the 
failed link. In addition to this local repair mechanism in the 
forwarding plane, we also introduce a complementary 
crank-back technique which allows nearby routers to 
perform traffic diversion in case the directly attached node 
of a failed intra-AS link does not have any feasible alternate 
route. The rationale behind is that, it still takes much shorter 
time to notify feasible routers a few hops away that are able 
to perform traffic diversion than directly incurring IGP 
re-convergence across the entire network, which may 
further cause unexpected BGP disruptions. Detailed FRR 
operations on top of the multi-plane BGP platform will be 
specified in section III.  
Our simulations based on both real network topologies 
and synthetically generated ones suggest that, as few as two 
routing planes (one primary + one backup) are able to 
achieve fast recovery for both intra- and inter-AS link 
failures based on carefully selected backup egress points 
through the proposed algorithm. On the other hand, the 
failure of a small proportion of network links cannot be 
directly handled through local repair, but still only a small 
number of hops of crank-back operation is sufficient to 
identify a feasible router for diverting the affected traffic.       
II. RELATED WORKS 
Various IP FRR techniques have been proposed in the 
literature for seamless network recovery in order to avoid 
disruptions to real-time services. Next-hop deflection is a 
commonly adopted technique that allows local repairing 
routers to intelligently deflect the affected traffic onto 
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 alternate next-hops that are not necessarily in the default 
IGP paths towards the destination [5][6]. Despite its 
simplicity, basic packet deflection is not able to guarantee 
failure recovery for every single link failure scenario. It 
should be also noted that, “careless” packet deflections may 
also cause unexpected BGP routing disruption, as the 
alternate next-hop router may use a different egress point 
according to its own IGP distance towards individual 
ASBRs. The Notvia scheme [7], currently being 
standardized in the IETF, makes use of IP tunnels that are 
able to automatically bypass network failures with 
guaranteed 100% failure coverage within a single AS. In [8] 
A. Kvalbein et al proposed to use multi-topology IGPs such 
as MT-OSPF [9] for achieving fast failure recovery where 
the affected traffic can be locally remarked to backup 
routing topologies in case a failure occurs in the default 
topology. To enable fast recovery in case of inter-AS link 
failures, O. Bonaventure et al proposed an intelligent FRR 
mechanism that allows the default egress router to 
immediately divert customer traffic through pre-established 
IP tunnels towards the secondary egress point once the 
primary route via its directly attached inter-AS link 
becomes unavailable [1]. It should be noted that existing IP 
FRR solutions deal with intra- and inter-AS failures 
separately, in which case dedicated mechanisms need to be 
applied against different types of failures. In contrast, we 
propose a holistic solution that is able to protect against 
both types of failures, and more importantly, to enable 
predictable and controlled egress point switching against 
the hot potato routing effect.   
III. MULTI-PLANE BGP FRR OVERVIEW 
Before introducing the proposed scheme, we first review 
the basic procedure of conventional IGP re-convergence 
and its potential impact on BGP routing decisions. For 
simplicity we assume a full-mesh i-BGP connection within 
the network. Once an intra-AS link fails, its directly 
attached router will send updated link state advertisements 
(LSAs) to notify other nodes about the failure. After all 
routers have re-computed new IGP routes (which may take 
up to seconds for RIB/FIB updating), the IGP distance from 
some routers towards individual ASBRs may change, in 
which case these routers may further change their egress 
point selection decisions for some remote destination prefix 
accordingly. Again, this procedure takes additional time, 
and meanwhile the original BGP routing configuration can 
be disrupted due to the unexpected egress point switching.  
In order to (1) achieve seamless failure recovery and (2) 
avoid potential BGP routing disruptions due to unexpected 
egress point switching, we introduce our proposed FRR 
scheme for carefully pre-provisioning backup BGP routes 
that can be completely controlled by the ISP. The main idea 
is that both the primary and backup egress points are 
strategically selected a priori in the default and backup 
routing planes respectively for each remote prefix (one 
single egress per plane for each prefix). In case an intra-AS 
link fails, the local repairing router immediately diverts the 
affected transit traffic away from the failure and sends it 
towards a desirable backup egress (through pre-installed 
MPLS/L2TP tunnels) that does not involve the failed link. 
Similarly, in case of an inter-AS link failure, the directly 
attached ASBR may also forward the affected traffic 
through tunnels towards pre-selected backup egress points, 
which is similar to what has been proposed in [1]. 
Compared to this more straightforward operation, we 
mainly focus on how to achieve fast failure recovery 
against intra-AS failures that may potentially cause 
unexpected BGP routing disruptions.  
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Figure 1. Multi-plane BGP reroute examples 
Consider Figure 1 as an example where the IGP weight 
for each network link is set to 1. Inter-AS traffic is injected 
into the network via ASBRs r1-r5, and among them r1, r2 
and r3 have BGP routes towards a remote prefix P (Figure 
1(a)). These routes, which are advertised by neighboring 
ASes, can be obtained from the BGP Adj-RIBs-In. By 
provisioning two BGP routing planes (i.e. one primary and 
one backup route for each prefix), we first assume that the 
egress points selected for that prefix in plane 0 (primary) 
and plane 1 (backup) are r1 and r2 respectively (Figure 
1(b)). Under such configuration, the next-hop toward P at 
router b points to router a in plane 0, as router a is the 
next-hop on the shortest IGP path to reach the selected 
egress point r1 (shown in the solid line). Meanwhile, the 
backup forwarding path from router b towards prefix P 
leads to the alternate egress point r2. Under the normal 
condition where no link failure occurs, the default 
forwarding table populated based on the BGP RIB in plane 
0 is used at all routers. As shown in Figure 1(b), all packets 
towards the destination prefix P are sent towards the 
primary egress point in plane 0 (i.e. router r1) from where 
they are delivered out of the local AS. The actual 
forwarding paths from ingress routers towards r1 are 
indicated with solid lines in the figure.  
A. Local repair 
Once a router has detected the failure of its directly 
attached link, it needs to immediately divert the affected 
traffic which originally uses that link to reach the 
corresponding destination prefixes in plane 0. In doing so, 
this router, which is known as the local repairing router, 
switches to the backup path (effectively an MPLS/L2TP 
tunnel) in plane 1 leading to the backup egress point. 
Consider again Figure 1(b) as an example. Once router b 
detects the failure of link b→a, it immediately diverts the 
 affected traffic towards prefix P to the backup egress point 
r2 through the pre-established tunnel. In this case the actual 
forwarding path from ingress router r3 towards the backup 
egress point is r3→(solid line)→b→(dash line)→r2. Since 
this tunnel is MPLS/L2TP based (instead of IP-in-IP), r2 
will not consult its own BGP table and return the diverted 
packets back to the original primary egress point r1 which 
is assigned with the highest local_pref value [1].  
In case of an inter-AS link failure (i.e. the loss of eBGP 
sessions), the directly attached default egress router may 
immediately divert the affected traffic to a pre-selected 
alternate egress point. For instance, in Figure 1(b) if r1 
detects the unavailability of the primary route through its 
inter-AS link, it activates the pre-established tunnel as the 
backup forwarding path (the dash path) in plane 1 towards 
the backup egress r2, and from there the packets are 
delivered out of the local AS.  
B. Crank-back operations 
Under certain circumstances it is not possible for the head 
router of a failed intra-AS link to directly find any feasible 
alternate path that can successfully bypass the failure. For 
instance, in Figure 1(b) link c→ a constitutes both the 
primary path (towards the default egress point r1) and the 
backup tunnel (towards backup egress point r2) for prefix 
P. In this case, link c→a is regarded as a critical link for 
prefix P which means this link is fully shared by both  
primary and backup planes and hence the head node c does 
not have any alternate route to bypass this link once it fails. 
In such a situation, we introduce a simple IP crank-back 
mechanism at core routers that allows previous-hop nodes 
to perform rerouting without forcing the entire network to 
re-converge. In the literature, crank-back operations have 
been proposed for MPLS-based failure recovery [10], but 
how this can be achieved in hop-by-hop based IP rerouting 
has not been investigated. As previously mentioned, 
updating IP forwarding tables at individual routers accounts 
for most of the time spent in IGP re-convergence. In 
contrast, crank-back operations only introduce very short 
time in notifying nearby routers (not necessarily back to 
ingress routers!) to switch to pre-installed backup paths in 
case of failures, which is significantly quicker. Now we 
continue with the previous example where c is about to deal 
with its local link failure. Since c itself does not have any 
alternate route available, it broadcasts a route-failure 
notification message Rt_FAIL(P) for prefix P on all the 
other network interfaces except the failed one (i.e. to 
routers b, r4 and r5). For scalability purpose, one such 
route-failure notification message may contain multiple 
affected prefixes in order to avoid broadcasting excessive 
dedicated messages in case a large number of prefixes are 
affected due to the same link failure. Nevertheless for 
simplicity we only illustrate with one prefix in our example. 
Detailed design of packet structure for route-failure 
notification messages is not specified in this paper. For each 
of those neighbors that receive a route-failure notification, 
if its next-hop towards prefix P in the default forwarding 
table is not the interface that received this message, it does 
not need to take any action. For instance in Figure 1(b) 
routers r4 and b simply drop this message as their default 
next-hops to reach P do not point to router c in normal 
forwarding. As router r5 finds the interface that receives the 
route-failure notification is exactly the one used as the 
default next-hop towards P, it will find a feasible backup 
tunnel to deliver the affected packets via an alternate egress 
point (r2 in this example). As a result the actual backup path 
is r5→(dash line)→b→(dash line)→r2. In case still no 
alternate routes can be found in the backup planes, the 
intermediate router will further forward the route-failure 
notification to all its interfaces except the one that has 
received it in order to continue the crank-back procedure. 
The entire procedure terminates either until a router that is 
able to successfully find a feasible alternate route for traffic 
diverting, or when an ingress border router (like r5) is 
reached. If the ingress node still does not have any feasible 
route, IGP re-convergence has to be performed in order to 
regain connectivity, as it is the case for most existing IP 
FRR schemes that are not able to guarantee 100% 
protection coverage. Figure 2 shows the basic operations 
for an intermediate router r that has received a route-failure 
notification message from one of its neighbors. In the 
figure, )(0 PNH r indicates router r’s default next-hop for 
forwarding traffic destined to prefix P in the normal 
condition, and )( vuPath k → represents the path from router 
u to v in plane k.  
Operations for Router r to perform crank-back 
 In the event of receiving message Rt_FAIL(P) from interface 
x: 
If xPNH r ≠)(
0  Then no action is taken 
Else exam each of the selected backup egress points )(Pjk   
        for P, )0( Kk <<  
     If find ))(( *
** PjrPathxk k
k →∉→∃  
     Then divert the affected traffic towards P using plane *k  
               through the corresponding tunnel to )(* Pjk  
 
      Else forward message Rt_FAIL(P) to Neighbor(r)\{x} to 
                 continue crank-back 
 
Figure 2. Crank-back operation 
IV. OPTIMIZING BACKUP EGRESS POINT SELECTION 
Although the crank-back mechanism at core routers 
provides additional capability for fast failure recovery, the 
procedure inevitably takes longer time compared to pure 
local repairs. Moreover, for some failure scenarios 
crank-back may still not be able to identify any feasible 
diverting router at all. In order to improve this situation, 
how to optimally pre-determine backup egress points needs 
to be carefully considered in the routing plane. In the 
previous example, if router r3 is selected as the backup 
egress point in plane 1, as indicated in Figure 1(c), we can 
see that the repairing router c is able to perform local repair 
by using r3 as the backup egress point for diverting the 
affected traffic towards P (shown in dot lines). In effect, in 
this specific example local repair is sufficient to deal with 
any single link failure that happens to all the nodes with 
more than one outgoing links, without resorting to 
crank-back operations. From this example we can clearly 
see the benefit of intelligent egress point selection in 
backup planes in order to achieve high degree of path 
diversity from each potential repairing router to the selected 
egress points. In this paper, we consider single link failure 
since it is the predominant form of failure in communication 
networks [15]. 
 We formulate the task of back egress point selection into 
an optimization problem that can be solved with a greedy 
algorithm. The physical network topology of an AS can be 
modeled as a directed graph (V, E) with node set V and link 
set E. Each AS has a border router set J ⊂ V, through which 
(1) eBGP reachability advertisements on remote prefixes 
are received from neighboring ASes, and (2) customers 
inject traffic into the network. In addition, an AS may 
contain some core routers that are not directly connected to 
local customers or other ASes. We consider each remote 
destination prefix P that can be reached through a set of 
ASBRs. Let Out(P) denote the set of ASBRs at which an 
advertisement for prefix P has been received. In BGP 
multi-plane routing, we consider K logical planes to be 
pre-provisioned in the local AS so that one dedicated egress 
router can be selected for each destination prefix P within 
each plane k (0≤ k <K). More specifically, one primary 
egress point is selected in the default routing plane 0, while 
up to K-1 egress points are selected in backup planes k (0< k 
<K). The total number of backup planes (i.e. the maximum 
allowable backup egress points for any specific prefix) can 
be determined by the ISP’s policies. Nevertheless, later in 
the paper we will show that one single backup routing plane 
will normally be sufficient for comprehensive failure 
protection, with very short distance of crank-back for a 
small proportion of critical links.  
It can be easily inferred that if a critical link fails, there are 
no alternate paths in any plane for its head node to directly 
divert the affected traffic. In this case, backup egress router 
selection that incurs minimum number of critical links is 
desirable. Towards this end, we define a binary variable 
)(PQl  to indicate whether intra-AS link l is a critical link 
with regard to its head node and remote destination prefix 
P. More specifically:  
⎪⎩
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As we have mentioned, the probability of having critical 
links can be influenced by egress router selection across 
individual backup planes. We define another binary 
variable )(, PX kj to indicate the actual egress point selection 
for prefix P in each plane k. Single egress point selection is 
adopted in our scheme, which means within each plane one 
single egress point is selected for each prefix across all 
BGP speakers. That is: 
⎪⎩
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In summary, the overall objective is to determine the value 
of a set of )(, PX kj  for each independently advertised 
prefix P in each routing plane k in order to: 
Minimize ∑
∈El
l PQ )(  
subject to the following constraints: 
If 1)(, =PX kj , then j∈Out(P)    ∀j∈J, 0≤ k<K        (1) 
}1,0{)(, ∈PX kj , }1,0{)(, ∈PY kl      ∀j∈J, 0≤ k<K      (2) 
Constraint (1) means the selected egress router j must be 
able to reach the destination prefix P in the first place. 
Constraint (2) makes sure that variables X and Y are binary. 
A simple greedy algorithm for solving the backup egress 
point selection problem is briefly described as follows. First 
of all, the default egress point for a prefix P under the 
normal condition is selected in plane 0 according to the 
ISP’s operational objectives such as conventional traffic 
engineering (TE) policies. Backup egress point selection is 
then performed plane by plane with the objective of 
maximizing the diversity as compared to those trees that 
have already been previously determined. Each of these 
trees can be described as the IGP path set from each router 
towards the selected egress router in each plane. When the 
egress point is to be selected in plane k, all candidate border 
routers in Out(P) that have not been selected in planes 0 to 
k-1 are examined. The one that incurs the least number of 
critical links with the trees that have already been 
determined is selected. If multiple candidate egress points 
exist with equal number of critical links, then the one with 
the lowest anticipated post-failure traffic load will be 
selected as tie-breaking. Of course, in order to achieve this 
type of load balancing after traffic diversion, the ISP needs 
to estimate in advance the inter-AS traffic matrix. The 
egress point selection algorithm for each prefix P is shown 
in Figure 3.  
Consider each j ∈ Out(P)*, compute 
the total number of critical links                 
shared by planes {0, …, k}
Select j ∈ Out(P)* that incurs 
minimum value of                as the 
primary egress point in plane k
Select the primary egress point  j*
from Out(P) in plane 0
Out(P)* = Out(P) - {j*}, k = 1
k < K?
∑
∈El
l PQ )(
∑
∈El
l PQ )(
END
START
Y
N
Out(P)* = Out(P)* - {j}, k = k+1
Multiple
candidates 
exist?
Select j ∈ Out(P)* that incurs lowest 
post-failure traffic load across all j ∈ J
Y
N
 
Figure 3. Egress point selection algorithm 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed fast 
failure recovery scheme, we use the topologies of two 
operational networks, namely the Abilene network 
(AS11537) [11] and the GÉANT network (AS20965) [12]. 
Information on inter-AS connections of these two networks 
is obtained from Rocketfuel [13] and [12] respectively. In 
 addition, we also conducted experiments based on 
synthetically generated topologies by the BRITE topology 
generator [14]. The topologies contain 50 nodes with 
border routers being randomly selected each time. 
Figure 4 shows the average proportion of critical links 
across all the independently advertised prefixes in both the 
GÉANT and Abilene topologies. We can see that with 
optimized backup egress point selection for each prefix 
(indicated by Opt. in the figure), only 26.5% and 12.2% of 
the network links are critical ones with two routing planes 
(i.e. one primary and one backup) in the two network 
topologies respectively. Three planes are sufficient to 
eliminate any critical link in the Abilene topology, while 
the corresponding proportion is reduced to 18.4% in the 
GÉANT network. However the situation is not significantly 
further improved with additional backup routing planes. On 
the other hand, we also implemented the non-optimized 
scheme with random selection of backup egress points 
(indicated by Ran. in the figure). As we can also see, the 
proportion of critical links in this case becomes much 
higher, especially when a small number of planes are used. 
Overall, five routing planes are needed in order to eliminate 
all critical links in the Abilene topology. This observation 
clearly indicates that the proposed failure recovery 
mechanism needs to be accompanied with careful backup 
egress point selection for achieving maximum efficiency. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of critical links vs. number of planes  
(Real topologies) 
TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF CRANK-BACK PATH LENGTH IN 
GÉANT AND ABILENE (OPTIMIZED EGRESS SELECTION) 
 
 
Crank-back path length (No. of hops) 
1 2 3 4 
2 planes 57.14% 14.29% 28.57% 0% 
3 planes 0% 0% 0% 0% 
(a) The Abilene topology 
 Crank-back path length (No. of hops) 
1 2 3 
2 planes 80.26% 19.74% 0% 
3 planes 86.36% 13.64% 0% 
4 planes 84.48% 15.52% 0% 
5 planes 82.69% 17.31% 0% 
6 planes 82.00% 18.00% 0% 
7 planes 82.00% 18.00% 0% 
(b) The GÉANT topology 
We further evaluate the performance of crank-back 
operations on those critical links that cannot be eliminated 
through optimized backup egress point selection. Table I 
shows the crank-back path length distributions (average 
values across all examined prefixes) in both network 
topologies with optimally selected backup egress points. As 
far as the Abilene topology is concerned, feasible diverting 
routers can be found by cranking-back with one single hop 
for 57.14% of the critical links if two planes (i.e. one 
backup path for each prefix) are provisioned. The worst 
situation is that three hops of crank-back is needed for 
28.57% of critical links in the topology. For the GÉANT 
scenario, although critical links cannot be fully eliminated 
using as many as seven planes (see Figure 4), the good news 
is that only two hops of crack-back is sufficient to identify a 
feasible diverting router for any critical link with as few as 
two routing planes. In effect, only less than 20% of the 
critical links need two hops of crank-back in such a 
situation. For comparison purpose, we also evaluated the 
performance with random selection of backup egress 
points. As it can be inferred from Table II, the average 
crank-path length becomes significantly higher than that 
used by the optimized algorithm with the same number of 
routing planes. By comparing between the results in Table I 
and II, we can see that optimized backup egress selection 
minimizes not only the proportion of critical links, but also 
the crank-back path length for more efficient routing failure 
recovery. 
TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF CRANK-BACK PATH LENGTH IN 
GÉANT AND ABILENE (RANDOM EGRESS SELECTION) 
 
 
Crank-back path length (No. of hops) 
1 2 3 4 
2 planes 21.74% 17.39% 26.09% 34.78% 
3 planes 65.22% 21.74% 13.04% 0% 
4 planes 92.31% 7.69% 0% 0% 
(a) The Abilene topology 
 
 
Crank-back path length (No. of hops) 
1 2 3 4 
2 planes 59.38% 33.33% 6.25% 1.04% 
3 planes 77.22% 21.52% 1.27% 0% 
4 planes 80.60% 19.40% 0% 0% 
5 planes 83.61% 16.39% 0% 0% 
6 planes 81.82% 18.18% 0% 0% 
7 planes 79.17% 20.83% 0% 0% 
 (b) The GÉANT topology 
 
We also evaluated the same performance metrics with 
synthetically generated network topologies that contain 50 
nodes, with border routers that have inter-AS connections 
(i.e. egress point candidates) varying from 5 to 25. An 
important objective is to investigate the performance of 
failure protection coverage with various richness of 
inter-AS routes that can be reflected by the total number of 
egress point candidates that may receive advertised BGP 
reachability messages via eBGP. As shown in Figure 5, the 
provisioning of two routing planes leads to 14.18% of 
critical links with 5 egress point candidates. The 
corresponding value decreases to 8.37% and 7.55% 
respectively if the total number of egress point candidates 
increases to 10 and 15. Further increase of the richness in 
inter-AS routes almost does not further improve the 
situation and hence is not shown in the figure. On the other 
hand, the proportion of critical links reduces as the number 
of routing planes increases up to 4, but any additional 
routing planes will not be able to improve the performance 
beyond that point, which is similar to the GÉANT and 
Abilene scenarios. Figure 6 indicates the proportion of 
critical links with random egress point selection. By 
comparing Figures 5 and 6, once again we can clearly see 
that non-optimized backup egress point selection leads to 
much higher proportion of critical links, which results in 
poor failure recovery performance. 
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Figure 5. Proportion of critical links vs. number of planes 
(synthetically generated topologies with optimally selected 
backup egress points) 
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Figure 6. Proportion of critical links vs. number of planes 
(synthetically generated topologies with randomly selected 
backup egress points) 
 
TABLE III. DISTRIBUTION OF CRANK-BACK PATH LENGTH IN 
SYNTHETICALLY GENERATED TOPOLOGIES (OPTIMIZED) 
 
 
Crank-back path length 
(No. of hops) 
1 2 3 
 
5 egress 
Routers 
2 planes 89.09% 10.91% 0% 
3 planes 87.88% 12.12% 0% 
4 planes 96% 4% 0% 
5 planes 100% 0% 0% 
10 egress 
Routers 
2 planes 91.43% 8.57% 0% 
3 planes 100% 0% 0% 
15 egress 
Routers 
2 planes 90.62% 9.38% 0% 
3 planes 100% 0% 0% 
20 egress 
Routers 
2 planes 86.11% 13.89% 0% 
3 planes 100% 0% 0% 
25 egress 
routers 
2 planes 91.18% 8.82% 0% 
3 planes 100% 0% 0% 
 
Finally, Table III shows the crank-back path length 
performance by the optimized backup egress point 
selection algorithm, based on the synthetically generated 
topologies. In case of relatively scarce inter-AS routes, for 
instance with only five egress point candidates, five routing 
planes are needed to guarantee maximum 1-hop crank-back 
for all critical links. When the number of ASBRs becomes 
as high as ten, three planes are sufficient to achieve the 
same effect. On the other hand, we notice that in every 
single scenario the maximum number of crank-back hops is 
two even if two routing planes are provisioned. Moreover, 
in most of the cases around 90% of critical links can be 
tackled with a single hop of crank-back. Once again the 
efficiency of our proposed scheme is indicated with 
optimized selection of backup egress points in the routing 
plane.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we introduce a novel fast failure recovery 
scheme based on multi-plane BGP reroute. Once an intra- 
or inter-AS link fails, the directly attached repairing router 
may immediately divert the affected traffic towards 
optimally selected alternate tunnels that are pre-installed in 
backup routing planes. A distinct benefit from the proposed 
scheme is that routing disruptions caused by intra-AS link 
failures (due to the hot potato routing effect) can be 
avoided, as the affected traffic will be always diverted to 
the egress points that are pre-determined by the ISP, rather 
than unexpectedly switching to undesired ones which may 
therefore suffer from post-failure congestions. In addition, 
we also proposed routing optimizations in terms of backup 
egress point selection for enhancing the failure recovery 
capability. Our simulations based on both real and 
synthetically generated network topologies show that only 
a small number of routing planes will lead to high degree of 
path diversity for fast reroute based on carefully selected 
backup egress points. These results indicate that the 
proposed paradigm can be regarded as an efficient and 
scalable solution for supporting high reliability in real-time 
multimedia communications.  
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